Inside the Crosshairs Page 8

  The summary added that, if the corps did authorize snipers, the U.S..30-caliber rifle M1C was “sufficiently accurate.” The study, declaring the ’03 Springfields and their Unertl 8X scopes obsolete, recommended the Stith 4X (Bear Cub) telescope with the standard Griffin and Howe fixed mount to go with the M1C. For all practical purposes, Project No. 757, in combination with the cease-fire in Korea, put an end to Marine Corps snipers.

  Snipers in the army fared no better in the post-Korea years. An article in the April 1954 Infantry School Quarterly. “The Case of the U.S. Sniper,” declared, “The U.S. Army has no trained snipers.” It went on to point out that, while FM 21-75 outlined an eighty-hour sniper-training program for squad snipers, commanders “generally ignored” the requirement. The author summed up the army’s policy on snipers by concluding, “It has not produced snipers in the past, and it will not produce them in the future.”

  In February 1957, an article in Army magazine showed that little or no subsequent progress had been made by the army in sniper development. According to the author of “Let’s Get the Most From Our Shooters,” snipers remained a rarity. The article stated, “In reality, most companies have none who are properly trained and qualified.”

  The same periodical published a piece the following June that noted that, even if the army properly trained its shooters, snipers had no adequate rifle with which to practice their craft. In the aptly titled “Modernize the Sniper Rifle,” the author claimed, “Our snipers are equipped with makeshift weapons!” He then recommended that a new sniper weapon be acquired to produce “the most psychologically terrifying force of combat: the precisely placed bullet.”

  What is now a faded, yellow report, dated April 19, 1960, resides on the shelves of the U.S. Army War College Library at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, apparently having made its way through several army commands without comment before coming to rest in the archives. The report’s condition and content are indicative of the army’s pre–Vietnam War outlook on snipers. The report, “Snipers, We Need Them Again,” by Colonel Henry E. Kelly, states, “Apparently the sniper is no longer considered essential in our infantry. The squad sniper, actually only a designated and specially armed infantryman, has been dropped from the rifle squad of the future. Likewise no provision is included for a sniper detachment in the battle group organization.”

  No decision makers paid any attention to Kelly’s report or to the few other supporters of sniper training, because overall planning remained focused on the mechanized battlefield. The ramifications of this thinking were widespread. In the mid-1950s, for instance, the services began reorganizing marksmanship training and replacing the known distance (KD) ranges.

  Since the Civil War, soldiers had fired their rifles at “bull’s-eye” targets at set distances of 100–500 meters. On the KD ranges, shooters learned to hit what they aimed at and to fear the waving of “maggie drawers”—a red flag raised from the protective trench by the target pullers when a round completely missed. Each soldier’s score depended on where he hit the target—the bull’s-eye, of course, being worth the most points.[21]

  The army now replaced the KD ranges with the Trainfire system, consisting of pop-up targets of various sizes that unpredictably appeared at different ranges and in random sequences. The targets remained exposed for only brief periods, forcing the shooter to find, aim, and fire quickly—and often to shoot low in order to kick up sufficient dirt and debris to knock down the pop-up target and thus get credit for the kill. Some aspects of the Trainfire system made sense, for the popups resembled enemy soldiers much more than did the KD bull’s-eyes. Unfortunately, however, the new quick-fire procedures further deteriorated the accurate shooting skills of soldiers.

  Also extremely telling about the army’s post–Korean War lack of interest in snipers was the mass issue that began in 1957 of M14 rifles to replace the M1 Garands. Each new M14 had a groove and screw recess on the left side of the receiver for mounting a telescopic sight or a night vision scope. However, the services failed to adopt a mount that would fit the M14.

  The first attempt to adapt the M14 for more accurate shooting came in 1958, when Captain Frank Conway of the U.S. Army Marksmanship Training Unit (USAMTU) at Fort Benning, Georgia, devised his own base to mount Weaver K-6 scopes on two M14s. Conway’s purpose was not to convert the M14 into a sniper weapon but to adapt it for international shooting competition.

  By the late 1950s most senior military leaders perceived the uniformed shooting teams as luxuries that depleted units of much needed junior officers and sergeants and that diverted resources through worldwide travel to participate in shooting competitions. A few of the more perceptive members of the shooting teams realized that those seeking to disband the marksmanship units put their positions and skills in jeopardy.

  According to Charles Henderson, one of the first marksmen to come up with a rationale to preserve the shooting units and their long-range skills was Chief Warrant Officer Arthur Terry, a member of the Marine Shooting Team in Hawaii. In Marine Sniper, Henderson quotes Terry as saying to Officer-in-Charge Lieutenant Jim Land, “If we don’t provide a service as a rifle and pistol team, we’re going to wind up losing our happy home. They’re not going to pay for us to run around the country and shoot—we have to deliver something worth the money … we might give the team a new meaning by pushing the sniper angle.”

  Over the next few weeks Land researched sniper history and developed a proposal recommending the initiation of sniper training. Land wrote “The Neglected Art of Sniping,” which began, “There is an extremely accurate, helicopter-transportable, self-supporting weapon available to the Marine Infantry Commander. This weapon, which is easily adapted to either the attack or defense, is the M1C sniper rifle with the M82 telescopic sight in the hands of a properly trained sniper.”

  In presenting his case, Land related the success of snipers in previous conflicts, including quotes from the World War I books of Herbert W. McBride and Neville A. D. Armstrong, and noted the sniper equipment still available. Land received permission from his immediate senior headquarters, the 1st Marine Brigade, to begin sniper training for selected infantrymen assigned to Hawaii. Late in 1960, Land and the Hawaii Marine Rifle and Pistol Team began a two-week sniper course at the Puuloa Rifle Range, near Barber’s Point Naval Air Station, Hawaii. The first week focused on marksmanship, the second on fieldcraft and land navigation.

  A year later Land’s sniper-training program provided regular classes to Marines assigned to Hawaii. For several years it remained the only formal sniper training in the Marine Corps—as well as in the entire U.S. armed forces. The training program received little publicity and few official records of it remain. The best summary of Land’s sniper classes comes from a press release issued by the 1st Marine Brigade Informational Services Office on January 26, 1962, that states, “There is very little printed information presently available on snipers and their methods.”

  The press release added that the school’s instructors used reference materials from other countries and their own experience as well as that of their students to teach sniping and scouting techniques. It concluded with an excellent perception of snipers at the time as well as a warning about the future. “In this age of push-button warfare,” the release stated, “little thought is given to the common infantryman who has nothing but a 10-pound rifle and a lot of courage. But beware of the sniper—he is deadly.”

  CHAPTER 6

  Snipers in Vietnam: U.S. Marine Corps

  ON March 8, 1965, lead elements of the 3rd Marine Regiment, 3rd Marine Division arrived at Da Nang as the first American combat troops in support of South Vietnam against the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and their Vietcong (VC) allies. From the time they landed in Da Nang until their withdrawal from the war zone more than five years later, Marines recognized that Vietnam was a different kind of war that required constant adaptation and innovation.

  Except for the brief periods of the three unsuccessful major offen
sives, the VC and NVA mostly avoided combat and fought only if they absolutely had to or if all factors favored a quick firefight victory with ample time and suitable terrain in which to escape. It was the type of war that brought the sniper and his skills to the forefront of effectiveness.

  For their part, the Communists adopted a simple strategy. In 1952, the Lao Dong Party, which governed North Vietnam, announced its objective: “The ultimate aim of the Vietnamese Communist leadership is to install Communist regimes in the whole of Vietnam, in Laos, and in Cambodia.”

  In 1957, the Viet Minh—both those who had remained in the south after the division of the country and those who had gone north and later returned—began an armed revolt against the Diem government. Those “revolutionaries”—referring to themselves as the National Liberation Front; the anti-Communists called them Vietcong—escalated their attacks throughout the late 1950s.

  The year 1959 marked a turning point. In January of that year North Vietnam’s Central Executive Committee issued 74 Resolution Number 15, which changed its strategy toward South Vietnam from “political struggle” to “armed struggle.” The following May the North Vietnamese government began to develop a supply route, later known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail, to South Vietnam along a series of roads and paths in Laos and Cambodia.

  To accomplish their aim, Ho Chi Minh and his North Vietnamese government continued the same strategy that the Viet Minh had used to topple the French—a three-phase methodology originally developed by Mao Tse-tung for the Communist takeover of China. General William C. Westmoreland, commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam from 1964 to 1968, described the three-phase offensive in his book A Soldier Reports. According to Westmoreland, “In Phase One the insurgents remain on the defensive but work to establish control of the population and conduct terrorist and guerrilla operations. In Phase Two, regular military forces are formed, guerrilla attacks increased, and isolated government forces engaged. In the climactic Phase Three, large insurgent military units go on the offensive to defeat the government’s large units and to establish control of the population. A particularly Vietnamese aspect of the final stage is the ‘khoi nghai,’ the general uprising, wherein the people theoretically arise and overthrow the government.”

  Two other major factors influenced the Communists’ three-phase plan. First, instead of allowing the Vietcong to conduct the war in South Vietnam by themselves, the North Vietnamese began sending advisers in 1963 and regular NVA forces in 1964. The second important influence on the VC/NVA strategy was the Communists’ patience and tenacity. From the beginning of the war, Ho Chi Minh stated that the Communists would willingly fight a “twenty-year war” and that the revolution was not a short-term undertaking.

  Throughout the conflict, the Communists did indeed remain patient as they consistently were successful in executing phases one and two of their strategy. Despite overwhelming U.S. and South Vietnamese superiority in firepower, mobility, and technology, the Communists conducted guerrilla warfare at will and frequently massed for small-scale attacks against units and bases. Whenever they felt threatened, they either withdrew to sanctuaries across the border in Cambodia or Laos or changed into civilian clothing and blended in with the local population.

  Despite their patience before the Americans withdrew and left the war to the South Vietnamese, the Communists did attempt on three occasions to escalate their offensive into phase three. In the Ia Drang Valley in 1965, the Tet Offensive of 1968, and the Easter Offensive of 1972, the Communists found that they could not defeat the Americans in sustained open warfare and that the general population did not rise up to help them. After each defeat, the Communists dispersed, withdrew, and waited for more opportune times. Each defeat reinforced the need for patience and the belief by the North Vietnamese leaders that they would be willing to accept defeat longer than the Americans would remain dedicated to the defense of South Vietnam.

  To meet the tactics of the enemy and to adapt to the demanding terrain and weather, Marine units at all levels began making adjustments to their methods of operations immediately upon their arrival in Vietnam. From squad to force level, the Marines changed their style of operation in order to provide security for themselves and their South Vietnamese allies while at the same time taking all measures to neutralize as many of the enemy as possible. In a war of attrition, where success came to be measured in enemy body count, the Marines quickly began to contribute to the combined allied total number of VC and NVA killed.

  The two divisions, two additional regimental landing teams, and a reinforced air wing of Marines ultimately assigned to Vietnam served in I Corps. Logically, the Marines, trained in amphibious warfare, would have served best in the Mekong Delta region of IV Corps, far to the south. However, true to the spirit of Vietnam’s being “a different kind of war,” the Marines spent the entire conflict in the thick jungles and mountains of the north.

  The reasons were simple—if illogical. In 1965, the Honolulu-based Pacific Command Headquarters developed contingency plans for “temporary” support operations in the Pacific that called for an initial Marine, rather than army, landing force. The shortage of deep-water ports in I Corps reinforced that plan since the Marines could be resupplied “over the beach.” In the rapid buildup of U.S. forces in Vietnam during the two years after the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, no one had time or impetus to transfer units from one end of the country to the other.

  Once operations began, the two Force Reconnaissance Companies and the two Division Reconnaissance Battalions made quick adjustments in “outguerrillaing the guerrillas” by conducting small patrols and adopting many of the enemy’s own tactics. Along with the regular infantry companies, the recon units relied heavily on artillery and airpower to support their operations and to engage enemy targets beyond the range of their organic small arms.

  Only when the VC and NVA attempted to escalate their offensive into phase three did Marine battalions and regiments fight as unified elements in what closely resembled conventional warfare. Otherwise, small unit counterguerrilla operations, in which squad leaders and platoon commanders operated with great independence, marked the long periods of the enemy’s remaining in phases one and two of their strategy.

  During those operations, the Marines discovered that they lacked the ability to quickly engage exposed targets at distances of more than 500 to 600 meters. The M14s, the basic infantry weapon of the first Marine units in-country, had a maximum effective range of 460 meters. The M16, initially issued in 1966 to completely replace the M14 by 1967, supposedly had the same maximum effective range, but true to its design, it proved much more effective in combat at 200 meters or less than it ever did at greater distances.

  The massive amount of artillery and air support dedicated to the war zone came from those assets assembled to fight a possible massive land war in Europe against the Soviets. While that almost unlimited source of extremely deadly and reasonably accurate means of engaging enemy forces beyond the range of organic infantry weapons was available, it was also wasteful.[22] Virtually no target was too insignificant to merit artillery and/or air attack. Ground commanders, artillery forward observers, and forward air observers adhered to no budget and had few qualms about expending hundreds of artillery rounds on a single enemy soldier. Multiple sorties of helicopter gunships and fixed winged fighter aircraft likewise delivered rockets, bombs, napalm, and machine gun fire.

  The problem with artillery and air support, aside from their “overkill” results, did not lie in their availability, accuracy, or willingness to respond to the needs of the ground commanders. Rather, the problem lay in the response time required to get the weaponry on target. Frequent delays occurred in getting clearances from adjacent units, air space controllers, and South Vietnamese officials. Further compounding the response time was the safety requirement that ground commanders call for marking smoke—a single round or rocket from the artillery, helicopters, or forward air controllers—to be sure targets were properly identified and targete
d. While that usually took only minutes, it often provided the enemy ample time to disperse and disappear into the surrounding jungle or countryside.

  The VC and NVA, with their very survival at stake, quickly learned to gauge the effective range of the Marines’ basic rifles and to use the brief warnings prior to assault by artillery and air to avoid being caught in impact zones. Marines at all levels became more and more frustrated at observing the enemy at distances beyond normal rifle range but having no effective means to immediately engage and neutralize him. It did not take long for the “old hands” to recall the effectiveness of snipers in previous conflicts and to once again seek the skills of the long-range killers.

  As more Marine units poured into Vietnam in the spring of 1965, it became evident that snipers could contribute in the fight against the Communists. By early summer, Marine commanders were requesting sniper equipment for forward combat units.[23] Colonel Frank E. Garretson, commander of the 9th Marine Regiment, became one of the first senior officer advocates of reintroducing snipers to the ranks. His commander, Major General Lewis W. Walt, concurred, and in late summer directed that a sniper program be formed in the 3rd Marine Division.[24]

  The best account of the first Marine snipers in Vietnam comes from Major Robert A. Russell, then assigned to the Ground Combat Division of the Marine Corps Landing Force Development Center at Quantico, Virginia. In an address during visits to Marine and army schools and training centers shortly after his return home from Vietnam in 1967, Russell explained that General Walt selected him to establish sniper training and directed the division staff to assist in securing rifles, scopes, and other equipment.