Inside the Crosshairs Read online

  Sotherland quickly found that his homemade sniper rifle had problems. “After only a few weeks in the field my Weaver scope began to fall apart. The horizontal reticle became invisible and the lenses were fogged up most of the time. The mount would not hold zero. I reluctantly had an M16 sent out and abandoned the M14 of which I had been so proud.”

  Overall, no army sniper policy or training existed in Vietnam during its initial two years of combat in Vietnam. The first official evidence that the army even considered using snipers in Southeast Asia came in a letter from Brigadier General E. L. Mueller, the director of doctrine and systems of the Department of the Army’s Office of Force Development.

  On January 10, 1966, General Mueller wrote to the commandant of the Marine Corps, noting a news release dated the previous November 3 on the use of snipers in the 3rd Marine Division. Mueller stated, “A survey is being conducted to determine if a review of the army’s current doctrine on sniping and sniping rifles is required in connection with current operations in the Republic of Vietnam. Request your comments on the use of snipers together with any statistical data available on their use in Vietnam.”

  The Marine Corps responded on January 28, 1966, with a brief overview of Captain Russell’s efforts to initiate sniper training and the sniper school graduates’ use of Winchester Model 70s and M1D rifles. Despite indications by the Marines that their early sniper efforts were productive, the army moved slowly. For the next twenty-four months the army studied sniper weapon systems for Vietnam service but took no direct measures to provide weapons or training for potential snipers.

  The official doctrine for the use of snipers during the early years of the army’s commitment in Vietnam remained that which had been spelled out in a series of field manuals (FMs) and technical manuals (TMs) that dated back to World War II. The 1962 edition of FM 21-75, “Combat Training of the Individual Soldier and Patrolling,” provided eight pages of sniper doctrine.[29] Paragraph 90 noted, “A sniper is an expert rifleman trained in the techniques of the individual soldier and assigned the mission of sniping.” In other words, sniping remained an “extra duty” of an ordinary rifleman in each squad or platoon.

  Interestingly, as the need for written guidance about snipers increased and combat intensified in Vietnam, the army produced less on the subject than it had during the years of peace. From the earliest publication in 1944, field manuals on the M1 rifle had included a chapter on the use and care of the C and D sniper models. The 1958 edition of FM 23-5, “U.S. Rifle Caliber .30, M1,” contained more than forty pages of information and pictures on the employment and care of M1 sniper models. Yet, the next edition of FM 23-5, published in May 1965, the same month the 173rd Airborne Brigade arrived in Vietnam, completely eliminated reference to sniper rifles.

  More than a year after army units began combat in Vietnam, official doctrine continued to exclude any requirement for sniper training. The field manuals for rifle platoon and company operations made no allowance for sniper training. The few references that did mention snipers provided conflicting information. ATP (Army Training Program) 7-18-1 stated a requirement for a minimum of three snipers per infantry platoon, but the then-current Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE)—the official document that authorized personnel and equipment for each unit—made no provision for snipers and sniper equipment.

  In December 1966, the Department of the Army published FM 23-71. “Rifle Marksmanship,” which repeated much of ATP 7-18-1. The manual included a chapter on “advanced marksmanship” and the employment of snipers, stating that one sniper should be assigned to each infantry squad. Yet, the army provided no actual authorization for sniper personnel, equipment, or training.

  In the midst of combat operations, field commanders in Vietnam had little time for authors of manuals or the developers of doctrine back in the States. They continued to field the few sniper weapons available and worked them into their tactical operations on the basis of trial and error. As the war expanded, however, the need for trained, properly armed snipers became more evident to army commanders at all levels.

  Considering the fragmentation and lack of focus on sniper personnel and equipment during the first two years of the war, the army approached the matter in a remarkably organized manner when it finally undertook official action. On February 23, 1967, Headquarters, U.S. Army, Vietnam (USARV), issued a “Letter of Instruction” to the Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) to “determine the organizational, doctrinal, and material requirements for sniper operations by U.S. Army units in the Republic of Vietnam.”

  The ACTIV immediately began to question field commanders and gather data, quickly documenting that several units were conducting limited sniping operations despite a lack of proper equipment. They also determined that sufficient data on which to determine future material and organizational requirements was not available. To provide additional information on which to make their recommendations, the ACTIV contacted the U.S. Army Marksmanship Training Unit (USAMTU) at Fort Benning, Georgia, for assistance in securing additional sniper equipment, reference material, and advice.[30]

  On April 19, 1967, USARV Headquarters issued a message prepared by the ACTIV to major combat units throughout the country announcing plans to conduct an evaluation of sniper operations and weapons in Vietnam. The units were informed that they would receive two models of scoped M14 along with Model 70 Winchesters and Realist telescopes for M16s to conduct the evaluation. The message also directed each unit to develop its own sniper training programs, organization, and concepts of employment.

  In April and May, sniper equipment arrived for the 1st, 4th, 9th, and 25th Infantry Divisions; the 1st Cavalry Division; the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division; and the 196th and 199th Light Infantry Brigades. Training took place in June and July.

  The 173rd Airborne Brigade received sniper equipment but did not issue it or conduct any training during the data-collection period. In a message to USARV, the commander of the 173rd explained that operational commitments, personnel turnover, and the nature of their area of operations precluded training and employment of snipers.[31]

  Data collection took place from July through October 1967, with monthly summaries of sniper activities forwarded to the ACTIV from each of the divisions and separate brigades. In the final month of the test, the ACTIV distributed questionnaires and received written responses from twelve brigade commanders, fourteen battalion commanders, forty-eight company commanders, forty-three platoon leaders, and eighty-seven individual snipers.

  The results of this extensive test—remarkable in its scope, especially considering it was conducted in the midst of combat—were analyzed and assembled by the ACTIV staff with Lieutenant Colonel David S. Moore heading the study as its project officer. On February 23, 1968, exactly a year after the USARV letter directed the study, the ACTIV issued its findings in a classified report, “Sniper Operations and Equipment.”

  According to the report, the combat units participating in the test committed 7,512 man-days to actual sniper operations. This resulted in 124 engagements producing forty-six dead enemy and another nine wounded. “The highest KIA to man-days ratio,” the report stated, “occurred in units that were operating primarily in the central highlands, coastal plain, and southern portion of the northern highlands of RVN. The lowest ratio of KIA to man-days occurred in units employed primarily in the lowlands area north of Saigon and south of the Central Highlands.”

  The report noted that the primary influences on sniper success were terrain and vegetation. Sniper engagements varied from an average of only 200 meters in units serving in jungle areas to 900 meters in those deployed in the more open coastal plains. The report concluded that most American units in Vietnam could benefit from assigned snipers and that nearly 80 percent of the interviewed officers supported the program. The report also assessed the M14 to be an adequate sniper weapon and said that the tested telescopes had proven satisfactory. In the final analysis, the ACTIV reported, “an adequate U.S. Army s
niper-training program does not exist,” and “there is a lack of definitive doctrine on employment of snipers.”

  Combining more than thirty-five pages of interview analysis, field summaries, and test results, the ACTIV recommended: “(1) Divisions and separate command brigades be authorized sniper equipment in addition to TOE weapons; (2) organization for sniper operations be tailored by divisions and brigades in accordance with their requirements; (3) the accurized M14 be designated as the standard sniper rifle in Vietnam; (4) a standard sniper telescope be designated; (5) a sniper-training program be provided for units in Vietnam; and (6) expanded doctrine for employment of snipers be developed and included in appropriate field manuals.”

  Headquarters, USARV, endorsed the ACTIV report and forwarded it to the commander in chief, U.S. Army, Pacific. The USARV endorsement also requested that the Department of the Army take the responsibility for developing “doctrine, to be included in appropriate field manuals, for employment of snipers” and for providing a sniper-training program that included lesson outlines.

  During the weeks before USARV forwarded the report, the Tet Offensive exploded all across South Vietnam in the enemy’s largest offensive to date. The official paper trail of “Sniper Operations and Equipment” stopped at the U.S. Army Pacific Command Headquarters in Hawaii despite the fact that the document’s distribution list indicated that copies went to various offices in the Department of Defense; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and every major U.S. Army command, school, and center, as well as the navy, air force, and Marine Corps. There is no evidence that any official action took place beyond the report’s delivery to Hawaii.

  Obviously, the Tet Offensive occupied the primary attention of all U.S. military commands for the next several months. Many of the participants in the sniper study either became casualties of the offensive or rotated to other assignments before additional action could take place. Those factors, combined with the fact that snipers had no senior ranking officer to champion their cause, resulted in the erosion of the foundation for precision shooting specialization that had been made during the ACTIV evaluation.

  Just as it seemed doomed to revert to its pre-ACTIV state, the army’s sniper program received the senior officer support that it needed to become a lasting part of combat operations. In February 1968, Major General Julian J. Ewell assumed command of the 9th Infantry Division, where he implemented a variety of different programs, among them the increased use of snipers. He later wrote in Sharpening the Combat Edge, “In the spring and summer of 1968 we were looking for ways to bring the enemy to battle on our terms and were willing to try anything within the limits of common sense and sound military judgment. To do this we adapted known tactical innovations to the unique [Mekong] delta environment, resulting in tactical innovations which proved highly successful.”

  Ewell increased the number of small-unit airmobile assaults and night operations. He also believed that his division’s area of operations in the relatively open delta region south of Saigon would prove to be excellent sniper country.

  Before his arrival in Vietnam, Ewell had already taken steps to establish a viable sniper program in the 9th Division by contacting the U.S. Army Marksmanship Training Unit (USAMTU) at Fort Benning, which had provided the ACTIV test with weapons and literature. The USAMTU was established in 1956 with the mission of improving the shooting skills of army riflemen. To do this the unit conducted marksmanship competitions and participated in worldwide matches. During the competitions the USAMTU staff was able to single out the army’s top shooters for assignment to Fort Benning for additional training. They would then return to their units to pass along their shooting abilities to other soldiers.

  At one time the USAMTU had attempted to establish a sniper-training course only to meet with resistance within the ranks. According to “The History of the U.S. Army Marksmanship Training Program” (published in November 1970), “The program was short-lived because of the lack of understanding and appreciation for the value of a sniper throughout the United States Army. In addition, the military attitude then envisioned any future conflict as a nuclear one with defeat or victory decided in hours.”

  In 1967, before departing for Vietnam, Ewell convinced the Department of the Army to direct the USAMTU to establish a sniper-training program. The USAMTU history explains, “The Vietnam War revived the need for snipers. Enemy forces demonstrated effective employment of snipers in varying tactical conditions. Attempts by U.S. Army elements to engage in countersniping activities were similar to attempts of previous wars: no special equipment or trained personnel and a lack of technique and doctrine for commanders at all levels. In 1968 the army decided to establish a school for snipers in Vietnam. The USAMTU was given the mission of writing the doctrine, furnishing the skilled marksmen and special equipment, and establishing a school in the 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam.”

  The USAMTU reacted quickly to provide equipment, doctrine, and instructors for sniper training in Vietnam. Some members of the unit began working with the Army Weapons Command at Rock Island, Illinois, the Combat Development Command of the Fort Benning Infantry Agency, and the Limited Warfare Agency at Aberdeen, Maryland. Their objective was to develop and field sniper rifles, scopes, mounts, and other equipment; the result was the adoption of the XM-21, a modified M14, as the army’s basic sniper weapon.[32]

  Meanwhile, other USAMTU members drafted copies of a sniper program of instruction. After all the modifications and rewrites were in, the Department of the Army published the program in October 1969 as Training Circular (TC) 23-14, “Sniper Training and Employment.”

  The most important aspect in meeting its mission of establishing a sniper school in Vietnam came with the reassignment of Major Willis L. Powell and eight noncommissioned officers from the USAMTU to the 9th Infantry Division in June 1968. Powell, a native of Guthrie, Oklahoma, had more than twenty years in the army and had advanced in rank to master sergeant before attending officer candidate school. Along with the experience of years of competition shooting at the national and international level, Powell had served a previous tour in Vietnam in 1963 and 1964 as an adviser to the ARVN.

  Powell and his sergeants immediately revamped the division’s M16 rifle training for new arrivals at Fire Base Bearcat, east of Saigon, and began training a few volunteers as snipers. Before Powell could make his school fully operational, the 9th Division headquarters turned Bearcat over to the Royal Thailand Army and moved south of Saigon to Dong Tam. There the instructors began construction of a 500-meter known-distance range while also accompanying patrols to learn the terrain and tactics of the Delta area of operations. According to an article in the division magazine, Octofoil, of January 1969, during their first month of operations the USAMTU instructors killed ten Vietcong at ranges in excess of 500 meters.

  Despite their individual successes, members of the marksmanship team found most commanders in the 9th Division too busy fighting the war to help establish a sniper school. Ewell, concerned about the slow progress of the program, recognized that its success depended on his personal intervention. In early August he assigned Brigadier General James S. Timothy the task of getting the sniper program off the ground. Ewell later wrote, “This gave it the needed boost.”

  Timothy, a West Point graduate and a decorated infantry veteran of World War II, had previously served in Vietnam as the commander of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, and as commander of the II Corps Advisory Group. Before joining Ewell as his assistant division commander, Timothy served in the States as the assistant commandant of the Infantry School at Fort Benning and had an appreciation for the USAMTU and of snipers in general.

  Powell, who served with Timothy at Fort Benning before their transfer to Vietnam, recalls, “General Ewell had a meeting with General Timothy and myself. He told Timothy to look over our shoulder to keep things progressing but more importantly to get whatever we needed to get the school going.”

  With Timothy’s support, the marksmanship team made
rapid progress. Powell, bearing the title Commandant, Sniper School, 9th Infantry Division, extended the Dong Tam range to 700 meters, and, with Timothy’s backing, recruited volunteers from each infantry battalion for sniper training. After two and a half weeks of training, the school graduated its first snipers in November. On November 19, one of the newly trained marksman recorded the sniper school’s first official kill north of Binh Phuoc in Long An Province.

  In early December the second class graduated from the 9th Infantry sniper school. Over the next months Powell and his staff continued to train 9th Division snipers as well as those from other units in the southern part of South Vietnam, including riflemen from the 25th Infantry Division and the 199th Light Infantry Brigade.

  During that period other American units conducted limited sniper training based on the experience and facilities developed during the ACTIV tests. As the only official army sniper program in place, the 9th Division provided advice and assistance on a limited basis to the training conducted by other units.

  “Operational Report of the 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1969” (dated May 15, 1969) provides an excellent summary of sniper training to that time. According to the then-classified report, “A total of five classes were conducted and a sixth class began 27 April 1969. The outstanding results obtained by the 9th Infantry Division snipers have generated interest in the sniper training throughout USARV. As a result, the school has conducted training for snipers and cadre personnel from six U.S. divisions and one separate brigade. These cadre will form the nucleus for sniper-training schools in those units.”

  When Powell and his team completed their one-year tour of duty in Vietnam in June 1969, a second group of instructors from the USAMTU under the leadership of Major Gary R. Chittester took their places. Powell returned to Fort Benning and rejoined the USAMTU, where he assisted in the writing of TC 23-14.